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I. INTRODUCTION
Like many states, Texas mandates parental involvement in minors' re-
productive decision-making by requiring an unemancipated minor to ob-
tain parental consent for an abortion.' Texas may constitutionally restrict
access to abortion in this manner because it allows minors to quickly and
confidentially seek judicial waiver of the requirement through a process
known as a judicial bypass.2 A key aspect of judicial bypass proceedings
is that a girl may petition for a waiver of parental consent in any county,
3
which allows the minor to protect her anonymity and seek county officials
adequately prepared to aid her in this process. This "open venue" clause
came under attack in the last legislative session. Texas House Bill 1212
would have restricted a minor to petitioning for a judicial bypass to only
"[her] county of residence or in the county in which she intends to have
the abortion performed."4 This Article will explain how, although House
Bill 1212 could prevent venue-shopping,5 restricting available venues
would prevent a significant number of minors from accessing judicial by-
1. Guttmacher Inst., Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortions, 2006 ST. POLICIES IN
BRIEF 1, available at http://www.agi-usa.orglstatecenter/spibs/spib-PIMA.pdf [hereinafter
Guttmacher] (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
2. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006).
3. Id. at § 33.003(b); TEX PARENTAL NOTIFICATION R.§2.1(a) (2000).
4. TEX. H.B. 1212, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
tlo/79R/billtext/HB01212H.HTM (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
5. Christy Hoppe, OK Expected for Parental Consent Bill: Measure Would Stiffen
Rules for Young Women Seeking Abortions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 26, 2005, at
4A, available at 2005 WLNR 2467834 (criticizing the open venue law as inviting venue-
shopping for sympathetic judges in liberal counties).
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pass proceedings, thus jeopardizing the constitutionality of the entire
process.6
Meaningful access to a judicial bypass protects some of Texas's most
vulnerable minors. The availability of the proceedings is essential to the
scheme's compliance with the Constitution.7 Ending open venue would
prevent many minors from utilizing the judicial bypass process at all be-
cause many county officials are unprepared or unwilling to provide assis-
tance. Also, without the confidentiality afforded to minors by open
venue, minors will be deterred from seeking a judicial bypass at all in
their own county.
II. JUDICIAL BYPASSES PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PROTECTING
VULNERABLE MINORS
Most girls involve their parents when deciding whether to continue an
unexpected pregnancy,8 and those who request a judicial bypass do so for
a good reason. In Texas, the only hotline offering legal counseling to
pregnant minors reports that from 2001 to 2005, seventeen percent of
callers reported being physically abused by a parent or guardian, thirty-
eight percent had been kicked out or threatened with being kicked out of
their homes for becoming pregnant, and twenty percent reported a high
probability of being forced by family members to continue an unwanted
pregnancy.9 Even those not facing physical danger, homelessness, or
family alienation had few resources. Thirteen percent of callers were al-
ready "supporting at least one child[,]" and thirty-five percent were
unemployed.1 °
6. See generally Doe v. Burton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (holding a state may not unduly
burden a woman's fundamental right to an abortion).
7. Id.
8. Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortion
Decisions, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 196, 196 (1992) (concluding that in states devoid of pa-
rental involvement laws, approximately seventy-five percent of teens seeking abortions
had told their parents about the pregnancy).
9. JANE'S DUE PROCESS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2 (Jan. 1, 2004-Aug. 31, 2005) (here-
inafter ANNUAL REPORT). Jane's Due Process is a 501(c)(3) organization that operates a
legal hotline and lawyer referral service for pregnant teens and provides training on the
law to clerks, pro bono attorneys, community members, and family-planning clinics. The
survey was conducted by telephone because it is a likely means for pregnant minor to
make an anonymous request for information. See also J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in
the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without
Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 61, 129-40 (2003) (describing in-
depth interviews conducted with Massachusetts teens regarding the reasons they wished to
avoid telling their parents about their choice to have an abortion). These statistics come
from initial screenings, when many callers are reluctant to share personal information.
10. See Tali Woodward, The Prop. 73 Puzzle, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN ON-
LINE, http://www.sfbg.com/40/05/news-og-abor.html, for a discussion of the real-world ef-
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The judicial bypass application system itself provides an effective
screening mechanism because the procedure further dissuades girls from
obtaining an abortion by requiring the girl to speak on the record to a
strange adult about her sex life. Although some girls may underestimate
the support they will receive from their parents,11 the question presented
here is how the inability to access a judicial bypass affects those girls who
have legitimate fears.12 Some parents abuse their daughters, and the rev-
elation of a teenage pregnancy can have dire physical consequences. 13
Without the possibility of a judicial bypass, these girls would have no
choice but to reveal a pregnancy, either to obtain consent for an abortion,
or when the physical signs can no longer be hidden. Either reason could
jeopardize the minor's physical safety, emotional wellbeing, and standing
within the family and community. These already vulnerable girls, espe-
cially those near the border, may consider obtaining a dangerous back-
alley procedure.
Another reason the parental consent provision is an unconstitutional
obstacle to a woman's access to an abortion is that many girls living alone
or with a non-legal guardian (such as a grandmother or aunt) simply have
no contact with their parents, making compliance with the consent re-
quirement unattainable.14 Thirty-five percent of Jane's Due Process call-
ers report they do not know how to reach at least one parent, because he
or she is "missing, deceased, or incarcerated."' 5 Five percent of callers
fects of parental involvement laws and how they endanger teens' physical health. See also
Ted Joyce, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Inc., Health Economics Program Meeting,
Changes in Abortions and Births Following Texas's Parental Notification Statute: A Re-
gression Discontinuity Approach 14 (Apr. 22, 2005) (transcript available at Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research Inc., available at http://www.nber.org/confer/2005/hes05/joyce.pdf) (illus-
trating how parental involvement laws have influenced teens on the cusp of their eight-
eenth birthdays to wait and have a more dangerous abortion later in their pregnancies).
11. Teresa Stanton Collett, Seeking Solomon's Wisdom: Judicial Bypass of Parental
Involvement in a Minor's Abortion Decision, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 513, 587 (2000).
12. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) ("The proper
focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group
for whom the law is irrelevant.").
13. See Molly Ivins, In Texas, Among the Horrors Awaiting Us Is H.B. 1212, Mandat-
ing Parental Consent for the Performance of an Abortion, THE TEX. OBSERVER, Feb. 24,
2005, available at http://www.janesdueprocess.org/gen-info/mediainquiries/horrorstories.
htm, for true stories of the abuse faced by Jane's Due Process callers; See generally TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006) (stating if notification of
parents would likely lead to the minor's physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, the court may
authorize the minor's consent to obtain the abortion without parental notification).
14. See Woodward, supra note 10 ("The ones who go through the process are the ones
who just can't tell their parents. They don't live with their parents-a lot of them are de
facto orphans. If people don't think those girls exist, they're very naive[.] They're in every
neighborhood.").
15. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
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report being unable to contact either parent. 16 Without the option of a
judicial bypass, these girls would have no choice but to continue an un-
wanted pregnancy, even if the adult they live with approves of their
choice to obtain an abortion.
Some parents have a moral objection to abortion but are willing to
accept their daughter's decision to obtain one. 7 In these cases, parents
feel a moral obligation to withhold consent, but are nonetheless willing to
go along with bypass proceedings. For these families, the bypass option
enables a pregnant minor to exercise her constitutional right, while pro-
viding her parents with a morally acceptable way to respect their daugh-
ter's choice.
III. JUDICIAL BYPASSES ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF TEXAS'S ABORTION LAWS
As written, Texas's parental consent law is constitutional. If the law
did not provide for judicial bypass, however, the law would violate the
constitution by giving a minor's parents a third-party veto over her repro-
ductive decision-making.
A. Texas's Law
Texas legislators passed a parental consent requirement in the 2005 leg-
islative session.1 8 The Legislature did so without revoking the preexisting
notification requirement.19 As a result, Texas is one of twenty-one states
requiring parental consent,20 and one of thirteen states requiring parental
notification.21 The Texas statutes provide for an expedited and confiden-
tial judicial bypass proceeding2 2 that allows minors to seek a judge's per-
mission to make the abortion decision without involving her parents.23
16. Id.
17. Interview by Susan Hays with group of girls, in Austin, Tex. (Mar. 24, 2005) (on
file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
18. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 164.052 (Vernon 2005).
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006).
20. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 164.052(a)(19) (Vernon 2005); Guttmacher, supra note
1, at 1.
21. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006);
Guttmacher, supra note 1, at 1.
22. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006);
TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 164.052(a)(19) (Vernon 2005). A layperson attempting to deter-
mine the laws governing a minor's access to abortion would need to refer both to the Texas
Family Code, which contains the notification requirement and the provision allowing for a
judicial bypass, and to the Texas Occupational Code, which requires consent. Rules laying
out the procedures for obtaining a bypass are not contained in the Texas Family Code at
all, but rather appear in rules promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court.
23. Id.
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The availability of these proceedings protects the constitutional rights of
minors and their parents by accounting for both the right of a minor to
make reproductive choices and the rights of her parents to act in her best
interest. Finally, the open venue provision allows a girl to obtain a bypass
in any Texas county,24 ensuring access to the proceedings.
B. The Bellotti2 5 Standard
Parental involvement laws present the courts with a unique balancing
problem, requiring the court to weigh a minor's right to reproductive lib-
erty against the rights of parents to make decisions regarding the health
and safety of their children without state interference. In Roe v. Wade,
26
the Supreme Court recognized a woman's right to seek an abortion.27 In
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,28 the Court
reaffirmed this right, holding that a state may not impose regulations that
have the "purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.",29 The Court found
that mandatory spousal notification posed such an obstacle3" because it
had the effect of discouraging women from seeking abortions alto-
gether,31 effectively giving a spouse the ultimate power of choice.32
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,3 3 the Court
held that states may require parental involvement in the abortion deci-
sion, but cannot give parents absolute authority to veto this decision dur-
ing the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.34 The Court in Bellotti v. Baird35
delineated guidelines for how such legislation may avoid placing an un-
due burden on a minor seeking an abortion.36 The Court held that any
parental involvement law "must provide an alternative procedure
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained."37 The proce-
24. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006) ("The applica-
tion may be filed in any county court at law, court having probate jurisdiction, or district
court, including a family district court, in this state.").
25. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
30. Id. at 893-94 (considering the ramifications spousal notification laws).
31. Id. ("[F]or many women [spousal consent] will impose a substantial obstacle.").
32. See id. (reasoning that a spousal consent requirement would have the same effect
as a law prohibiting abortion altogether).
33. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
34. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976).
35. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
36. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 622 (1976).
37. Id. at 643.
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dure must: (1) allow the minor to show either (a) that she is mature and
well-informed enough to make the decision without involving her par-
ents, or (b) that the abortion is in her best interest; (2) take place expedi-
tiously; and (3) adequately protect the minor's anonymity.38
C. Measuring Texas's Law Against Bellotti
39
Although debate continues among scholars as to the constitutionality
of legislation mandating parental involvement, Texas's law comports with
the Bellotti standard. Texas meets this three-pronged standard by al-
lowing 1) for a bypass under the appropriate circumstances, 2) requiring
that the proceedings take place quickly, and 3) protecting the minor's
anonymity.
The Texas Family Code satisfies Bellotti's first prong by allowing the
court to decide "whether the minor is mature and sufficiently well in-
formed to make [the decision] without notification of either of her par-
ents ... or whether notification is in the best interest of the minor[.]"4
Texas allows for a judicial waiver of the consent and notification require-
ments in cases where a minor shows, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence,41 that she is mature and sufficiently well informed to make the
decision independently,42 notification would not be in her best interest,4 3
38. Id. at 643-44.
39. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
40. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006).
41. Id. In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Tex. 2000) (declaring that "[i]f the minor's
uncontroverted testimony to this effect were clear, positive, and direct, and not impeached
or discredited by other circumstances, the trial court would have to accept it as fact").
"The trial court is not free to disregard [uncontroverted testimony] merely because the
court does not believe the witness to be credible." In re Due 4, 10 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Tex.
2000).
42. In re Doe (Doe 1), 19 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Tex. 2000) ("[A] minor is mature and
sufficiently well informed .. when the evidence demonstrates that the minor is capable of
reasoned decision-making and that her decision is not the product of impulse, but is based
upon careful consideration of the various options available to her and the benefits, risks,
and consequences of those options."); In re Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2000) (listing
the factors in the maturity determination: age, education, academic achievement, extracur-
ricular activities, and future plans); In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d at 249 (finding the maturity deter-
mination also includes whether the minor has shown that she obtained information on
abortion, knows the alternatives, and is cognizant of the "emotional and psychological as-
pects" of abortion).
43. In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2000) (holding when determining the mi-
nor's best interests, Texas courts consider "the minor's emotional or physical needs"; emo-
tional or physical danger facing the minor; "the stability of the minor's home and whether
notification would cause serious and lasting harm to the family structure; . . .[and] the
effect of notification on the [parent-child] relationship").
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or notification may lead to her physical, sexual, or emotional abuse. 4
Texas goes beyond the Bellotti minimum by allowing for a minor to ob-
tain a bypass when making the decision independently is in her best inter-
est, rather than having the abortion itself.4
In accordance with the second prong of Bellotti, Texas's bypass pro-
ceedings take place expeditiously. 46 According to the Texas Family Code,
a minor is entitled to both a guardian ad litem and an attorney.4 7 Fur-
thermore, a judge must rule on the matter within two business days. If a
court fails to rule on an application by five o'clock in the evening on the
second business day antedating the filing, the application is deemed
granted.a If the application is denied, the Texas Family Code provides
for a "rocket docket" appeal.49
Texas's procedures meet the third prong of Bellotti by adequately pro-
tecting the anonymity of minors.5" The Texas Parental Notification Rules
and Forms ("Parental Rules") make extremely clear that the records of
bypass proceedings are to be maintained with the utmost confidential-
ity.5 l For example, these cases are styled "In re Jane Doe." The open
venue provision allows girls to seek a judicial bypass in a county away
from neighbors and relatives who might recognize them at the
courthouse.52
Thus, because Texas's law is drafted in conformity with Bellotti, Texas's
parental consent requirement passes constitutional muster. Without
availability of a judicial bypass, Texas could not impose a consent
requirement.
44. TEX. FAM. CODE ArN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006); In re Doe 2,
19 S.W.3d at 282 (finding a general fear of telling one's parents is not enough to support a
finding that notification is not in the minor's best interest, but sufficient evidence exists to
make this finding when "there is more than a scintilla of evidence that notification may
lead to Doe's abuse"). See generally In re Doe 10, 78 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. 2000).
45. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006) (stating
when the court finds notification is not in the applicant's best interest, the court's order
should authorize the minor to execute the forms without parental notification).
46. Id. at § 33.003(g) (instructing the court to make a decision on the minor's applica-
tion immediately upon the hearing's end; see also id. at § 33.003(h) (stating "[t]he court
shall rule on an application.., and shall issue written findings... on the second business
day after the date the application is filed with the court").
47. Id. at § 33.003(e).
48. Id. at § 33.003(h).
49. Id. at § 33.003(a) (mandating that a Court of Appeals rule within two business
days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal).
50. TEX. FAM. CODE. § 33.003(a) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006) (listing steps
taken by court to preserve anonymity of the minor).
51. TEX. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION R. § 1.3(a)-(c) (2000) (instructing that any identi-
fying information be removed from court documents).
52. See id.
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IV. MANY COUNTY OFFICIALS ARE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO
ASSIST WITH JUDICIAL BYPASSES
Although Texas's law meets the requirements of Bellotti, the practical
realities of its application in Texas are more dubious. District and county
clerks are indispensable to bypass proceedings, but in many counties,
these officials provide unreliable assistance. Relying on the results from
telephone surveys of district clerks' offices conducted by Laura Smith,
this section will illustrate how a minor has less than a fifty percent chance
of receiving minimal assistance if she is restricted to her county of resi-
dence.53 Seeking assistance in a county with an abortion provider slightly
increases her chances.54 Nevertheless, the practical availability of bypass
proceedings remains substantially limited as a result of the minor's
county of residence.
A. The Role of Clerks in Texas
According to the Parental Rules promulgated by the Texas Supreme
Court, minors file an application for a judicial bypass through the district
and county clerks. 55 Upon request, district and county clerks must pro-
vide application forms and a copy of the Parental Rules.56 "The clerk
must give prompt assistance-in a manner designed to protect the mi-
nor's confidentiality and anonymity-to persons seeking to file an appli-
cation., 57 The clerk is charged with accepting the application, assigning it
to the appropriate court, 8 and providing the court with a copy of the
application.59 If the reviewing judge fails to make a timely ruling on the
application, it is deemed "granted," and the clerk must issue a certificate
to this effect.6" Thus, clerks play a central role in the application process
by making the application available to the public, ensuring each applica-
tion is presented to a judge, and providing appropriate paperwork in the
event the judge fails to rule timely. However, clerks are often not a relia-
ble source of information for prospective applicants. A number of recent
surveys demonstrate that clerks in Texas do not provide reliable informa-
53. See Telephone Interview of All District Clerk Offices, in Tex. (Spring 2006) [here-
inafter District Clerk Offices] (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues).
54. Id.
55. Compare TEX. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION R. § 1.7 (2000), with TEX. Occ. CODE
ANN. § 164.052 (Vernon 2005) (demonstrating the Parental Rules will continue to govern
bypass proceedings, even though the law now requires consent in addition to notification).
56. Id.
57. TEX. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION R. § 2.2(a) (2000).
58. Id. at § 2.1(b) (2)-(4).
59. Id. at § 2.2(c).
60. Id. at § 2.2(g).
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tion about judicial bypass proceedings.6' Furthermore, because most
clerks are not prepared to offer information to the public, meaningful
access is further limited.62
B. The Spring 2006 District Clerk Survey
63
In the spring of 2006, a survey was conducted of all 254 district clerks in
Texas," in order to ascertain the quality of assistance clerks were provid-
ing by telephone to prospective applicants. 65 Telephoning allows access
to information, without arousing suspicion by having to leave home, and
reduces the risk of being recognized by friends or family. Only district
clerks were surveyed because they are responsible for "(1) record[ing]
the acts and proceedings of the court; (2) enter[ing] all judgments of the
court under the direction of the judge; and, (3) record[ing] all executions
issued and the returns on the executions." 66 In a large number of Texas
counties (those with less than 8,000 people), district and county clerk du-
ties are fulfilled by the same person.67
1. The Calls
In order to achieve results that could be compared, surveyors used a
uniform format for each call. Every person answering the phone in the
district clerk's office would hear, "Hi, I'm calling to find out how a girl
who's not yet eighteen and wants an abortion can get a judge's permis-
sion to avoid telling her parents., 6 8 If asked, the caller would deny that
she was calling for herself and indicate she was only calling to get infor-
mation about the process. Nonetheless, all three surveyors were young
women, making it likely to conclude that the caller was requesting infor-
mation for herself or a friend. The survey results generally indicate what
an actual pregnant minor would encounter when seeking information by
telephone about a judicial bypass. This survey parallels the format em-
ployed by Melissa Jacobs in her 2003 study,69 and by Jane's Due Process
61. Melissa Jacobs, Are Courts Prepared to Handle Judicial Bypass Proceedings?,
HUMAN RIGHTS (Winter 2005) at 4 (studying district and county court offices throughout
Texas in 2003); District Clerk Offices, supra note 53.
62. See District Clerk Offices, supra note 53 (noting the various obstacles to accessing
application information).
63. This study was conducted by Laura Smith as part of a semester-long internship at
Jane's Due Process.
64. See District Clerk Offices, supra note 53.
65. See id. (building upon the findings of Melissa Jacobs's study).
66. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 51.303(b) (Vernon 2005).
67. Id. at § 51.501(a).
68. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53.
69. Jacobs, supra note 61, at 2 (studying district and county court offices throughout
Texas in 2003); District Clerk Offices, supra note 53.
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in 2005.70 Professor Helena Silverstein also conducted similar studies in
Alabama in 2001, 7" and in Pennsylvania in 1997.72
2. Call Results
The survey indicates that less than half of district clerks' offices were
prepared to offer a minimal level of assistance, further showing that open
venue is necessary for minors to access bypass proceedings.73 Slightly
more than half of those counties with abortion providers were able to
offer assistance. 4 The responses were divided into eight categories: (1)
acknowledgment that the office handled judicial bypasses; (2) statements
that they did not know about judicial bypass proceedings; (3) referrals to
attorneys for advice; (4) referrals to other government offices; (5) clinic
referrals; (6) indications that the particular office or county could or
would not handle such cases; (7) refusals to give information; and, (8)
suggestions that the caller contact another county.7 5
The following chart illustrates the breakdown of responses:
refused information 8%
go to another county 3%
call a clinic 2%
do'/cnt %responsibility M responsibility ackcnowledged
acknowledged i don't know
39% El call an attorney
govern meat referral 14% . government referral
3 don't/can't
0 call a clinic
E]go to another county
EO refused information
call an attorney 24% don't know 10%
Some "wrong answers," such as those who said they did not know if the
clerk's office could offer assistance but referred the caller to an abortion
or rape crisis clinic, had a reasonable chance of eventually steering the
70. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53.
71. See generally Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speriel, "Honey, I Have No Idea":
Court Readiness to Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IowA L.
REV. 75 (2002).
72. See generally Helena Silverstein, Road Closed: Evaluating the Judicial Bypass Pro-
vision of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 73 (1999).
73. See generally id. at 79-81. (finding that, in 1997, only eight of Pennsylvania's sixty
judicial districts were able to provide complete information about the state's parental in-
volvement law); see also Silverstein & Speitel, supra note 71, at 106-07 (discussing how the
problem of inadequate preparedness of the district courts is not unique to Texas).
74. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53.
75. Id. at § 3.
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caller in the direction of a bypass. Other responses, like one clerk's reply
that "supposedly" the law allowed bypasses, but that she did not give
them, did not provide the caller with a reasonable amount of information.
a. Answers Acknowledging the Clerk's Responsibility
Almost forty percent of responses acknowledged that the district
clerk's office handled judicial bypasses.76 In this category, a response
merely needed to acknowledge that the paperwork and/or procedure ex-
isted, and it was somehow affiliated with the district clerk's office-this
being the minimum amount of information necessary for a girl to have a
reasonable chance of finding the necessary paperwork and getting a hear-
ing. These responses ranged from detailed descriptions of the process, to
simple statements advising the caller that the necessary paperwork could
be picked up at the clerk's office.
Some counties offered especially sympathetic assistance. One person
answering in Bexar County rattled off the procedure immediately upon
request.77 Another woman in Bandera County requested the caller's
phone number in order to set up a court date.78 The clerk from Cochran
County invited the caller to meet at her home to ensure privacy,79 and
respondents in Swisher and Ward Counties were equally aware of privacy
concerns.8" Similarly, the district clerk's office in Terrell County stressed
that after-hours meetings were available.81 An employee in Oldham
County went out of her way to mention the right to appeal and seemed
very willing to help.8" This willingness to help was equally apparent from
employees in Bosque County and Pecos County.83
76. Id. at § 4 (finding the counties which acknowledged bypasses were: Anderson,
Austin, Bandera, Baylor, Bell, Blanco, Borden, Bosque, Brazos, Briscoe, Brown, Burleson,
Burnet, Caldwell, Cass, Castro, Chambers, Cherokee, Childress, Clay, Cochran, Comal,
Concho, Cooke, Coryell, Crane, Culberson, Dawson, Denton, DeWitt, Dickens, Ector,
Fort Bend, Franklin, Freestone, Gaines, Gray, Hale, Hamilton, Hardin, Harris, Haskell,
Hays, Hemphill, Hidalgo, Hill, Hockley, Hood, Houston, Irion, Jackson, Jefferson, Jones,
Karnes, Kaufman, Kendall, Kenedy, Kleberg, Leon, Llano, Lubbock, Lynn, Marion, Mata-
gorda, Milam, Montague, Navarro, Nueces, Oldham, Parmer, Pecos, Potter, Rains, Ran-
dall, Reagan, Real, Roberts, Schleicher, Shackelford, Stonewall, Sutton, Swisher, Taylor,
Terrell, Terry, Throckmorton, Tyler, Val Verde, Victoria, Waller, Ward, Washington, Webb,
Wharton, Willacy, Wilson, and Young).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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However, some answers acknowledging responsibility (fewer than ten
percent) also conveyed potentially discouraging statements.84 A woman
in Anderson County was happy to offer assistance, but mentioned in
passing that sometimes the judge orders counseling with a minister.8 5 Al-
though some girls might welcome a minister's advice, the prospect of dis-
cussing her sex life with yet another adult might be enough to prevent a
potential applicant from pursuing her application. Additionally, many
judges use their role in bypass proceedings to advance a conservative po-
litical agenda.86
Responses from Real and Caldwell Counties indicate that a judge may
not be available or the process might be lengthy,87 without mentioning
that the matter must be ruled on within forty eight hours, and that a
judge's failure to do so would render her bypass "deemed granted."88 A
caller unaware of this fact would likely give up.
In Kaufman County, the clerk's office suggested that the only way to
circumvent the consent requirement was by a showing that the caller was
in physical danger, or in danger of getting kicked out of the home.89 This
clerk was apparently unaware that judicial bypasses are also available to
"mature and sufficiently well-informed" minors or those for whom the
chance to make the decision independently is in their best interest for
other reasons. 90
The response from Gray County suggested that a girl might need to be
sixteen to file,9 1 which is untrue92 and would have an obvious deterrent
effect on any caller younger than sixteen.93
84. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 2.
85. Id. at § 4.
86. See Helena Silverstein & Kathryn Lundwall Alessi, Religious Establishment in
Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 473 (2004) (discuss-
ing the practice of ordering religious counseling as a condition of receiving a judicial bypass
waiver).
87. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(h) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006).
89. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
90. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979).
91. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
92. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(c) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006) (requiring
judicial bypass applicant to be a pregnant minor, unmarried, and under eighteen years of
age).
93. See id.
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b. "I Don't Know" Answers
Ten percent of the people who answered calls simply had no idea what
to say. 94 An "I don't know" from the district clerk's office could effec-
tively terminate a minor's access to the judicial bypass to which she is
constitutionally entitled. Many of these responses were given in an an-
noying tone, either for asking for what the receptionist believed was for-
bidden legal advice or because the person answering the call found the
subject matter distasteful. Some of these responses may not have been
intended as judgmental, and were not overtly judgmental, but would not
have inspired confidence in a caller. Many times, this type of response
was coupled with a verbal expression like "oh my," which indicated to the
caller that she was in a bad situation. The overriding message from each
of these responses, regardless of motivation, was the same: You are alone.
If the office charged with implementing a procedure knows little to
nothing about it, the minor may suspect that no one else will. When a
person in an apparently official capacity expresses disdain or disapproval
for the option she seeks to exercise, this may discourage the minor from
seeking other avenues to access the legal system, for fear of being looked
down upon or simply because she may think that all county officials will
have the same reaction.
c. Attorney Referrals
About a quarter of responses either told the caller that this was a legal
question they were not allowed to answer or told her to call an attorney. 95
This includes people who said things like "I don't know, because that's a
legal question" (without explicitly telling the caller to contact an attor-
ney), explicitly saying that the caller would need an attorney, or saying
that the judge would not grant judicial bypasses (clearly implying that the
minor's next call should be to an attorney).96
In some respects, this answer is less threatening to a girl's meaningful
access to a judicial bypass than others. An attorney would be able to
94. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 2 (responding with a variation of "I
don't know" were: Collin, Cottle, Delta, Edwards, Fayette, Foard, Garza, Gonzales,
Grimes, Harrison, Hopkins, Jack, King, Knox, Lee, Madison, Motley, Robertson, Runnels,
San Patricio, Sherman, Titus, Trinity, Uvalde, Wilbarger, and Zapata).
95. Id. (including: Andrews, Angelina, Archer, Atascosa, Bailey, Bastrop, Brazoria,
Brewster, Ellis, Erath, Falls, Fannin, Fisher, Floyd, Galveston, Gillespie, Grayson, Howard,
Hunt, Jeff Davis, Jim Hogg, Johnson, Kent, Kerr, La Salle, Lampasas, Liberty, Limestone,
Lipscomb, Live Oak, Maverick, McCulloch, Medina, Mills, Morris, Nacogdoches, Newton,
Nolan, Ochiltree, Orange, Palo Pinto, Parker, Polk, Red River, Reeves, Rockwall, Rusk,
Sabine, San Augustine, San Jacinto, San Saba, Scurry, Shelby, Starr, Tarrant, Travis, Van
Zandt, Wheeler, Wichita, Williamson, and Wood).
96. See id. at § 3.
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research the applicable law and help the minor through the proceedings,
assuming an attorney will take the case. But because of the prohibitive
expense of attorneys' fees, a response by the clerk recommending she
contact an attorney would probably deter a girl with limited resources
and transportation options. A girl may call a legal services hotline as an
alternative, but restrictions on Legal Services Corporation funding some-
times do not allow them to handle such cases. If the district clerk had
followed "see an attorney" with the information that a girl could have
one appointed to her for free, this deterrent effect would be largely miti-
gated. But, when asked, almost forty percent of counties did not know
that an attorney would be provided for the girl, much less volunteer the
information.97
d. Referrals to Another Local Government Office
Fourteen percent of responses referred the caller to another local gov-
ernment office.9 8 Most often these statements recommended contacting
a judge, the judge's office or secretary, or the county attorney.99 In some
cases, it was unclear whether many of these responses meant that the
clerk did not handle them and the other office had an affirmative respon-
sibility, or if the person just had no idea and thought the other office
might be of assistance.100
In counties such as Cameron, the county clerk handles all bypass pro-
cedures because of the office's physical location in the courthouse.101 In
a county like Cameron (where, interestingly, the clerk would not provide
information without the minor coming to the office), a referral to the
county clerk would be a meaningful way to obtain a bypass. Many others,
what seemed like the vast majority, were simply guessing.1 0 2 It seems
97. Id. at § 4.
98. Id. (including: Aransas (county judge's office), Armstrong (judge), Brooks
(judge), Camp (county attorney), Carson (judge's office), Coke (judge's office), Coiling-
sworth (county judge), Colorado (county judge), Comanche (county judge's office), Crock-
ett (district judge), Dallam (judge), Dallas (family court office), Duval (judge's office),
Eastland (county judge), Hall (judge), Hardeman (district judge's secretary), Henderson
(justice of the peace with implication that district judge refused to sign them but justice of
the peace might), Hudspeth (justice of the peace), Hutchinson (judge's office), Jasper
(judge's office), Jim Wells (judge's office), Kinney (county judge's office), Lamar (county
attorney), Lamb (judge), Lavaca (county judge's office), Mason (county judge), Menard
(district judge), Panola (judge), Presidio (judge's office), Somervell (judge's office), Ster-
ling (district judge), Upshur (judge's office), Upton (judge's office), Winkler (district
court), Wise (county judge's office), and Zavala (district judge's office)).
99. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at § 4.
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highly unlikely that a judge's secretary or the judge himself is truly re-
sponsible for handling these procedures and paperwork. 1°3 Alternate of-
fices to which clerk's offices referred callers invariably could not provide
information on bypass proceedings. 10 4 Further, it is highly unlikely that a
minor seeking an abortion would feel comfortable calling a judge's direct
line, even if directed there.
e. Clinic Referrals
Two percent of the responses referred the caller to an abortion
clinic.'0 5 A study in Pennsylvania determined that referrals to abortion
clinics generally yielded meaningful access to bypass proceedings. 0 6
Most often if a girl gets confirmation from the clerk's office that a bypass
is available and she is told that the clinic will know what to do, she can
obtain help at the clinic.10 7 These clinics must be aware of the laws for
their own legal responsibility, and may help a minor contact an organiza-
tion like Jane's Due Process. 08 Although girls referred to a clinic may
eventually have meaningful access to bypass procedures, the mandated
responsibility lies with the state government. Texas rules charge clerks
with this duty,0 9 and clinics can only help where clerks, ignorant about
judicial bypasses, refer callers to them. Additionally, ninety - three per-
cent of counties in Texas have no abortion provider, 10 and a girl might
inadvertently call (or be purposefully referred to) an anti-choice
''clinic.'111
103. TEX. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION R. § 1.7 (2000) (requiring the clerk's office to
provide application forms for judicial bypass).
104. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
105. Id. (including Frio, McLennan, Midland, Montgomery, and Walker).
106. Silverstein, supra note 72, at 84.
107. See id.
108. See ANNUAL REPORT supra note 9, at 2 (stating Jane's Due Process will help a
girl through a judicial bypass).
109. TEX. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION R. § 1.7 (2000).
110. NARAL, PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE RiGrs IN THE UNITED STATES, TEXAS, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/
choice-action-center/in-yourstate/who-decides/state-profiles/texas.html (2006).
111. See J.A. Mertus, Fake Abortion Clinics: The Threat to Reproductive Self-Determi-
nation, 16 WOMEN & HEALTH 95 (1990). See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED'N OF AM.,
AN-n-ABORTION COUNSELING CENTERS, available at http://members.aol.com/femnet/
aborfakes.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006) for a description of the tactics used by anti-
choice "clinics" and the threat they pose to women.
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f. "We Don't (or Can't) Do That"
Four percent of responses indicated that they would not or could not
help a minor obtain a judicial bypass for various reasons.'1 2 Some
seemed not to know these proceedings existed," 3 while others indicated
that their particular county was unwilling or unequipped to handle
them.
14
The response from Hansford County indicated the district judge "will
not sign an order like that," that the county judge was not empowered to,
and that the paperwork could be picked up in their office and taken else-
where 1 5 The person who answered the phone in Kimble County said
that proceedings could not take place in their county because they have
no court reporter and the statute requires a transcript be made of the
proceedings. 1 6 Martin County said their judges would not sign the
paperwork." 7 Mitchell County erroneously stated that the matters were
not handled by district courts, only by county courts. 18 Yoakum County
answered that their judge was out of Terry County, and as far as she
knew, they could not handle this issue. 119 The response from Stephens
County was simply "She can't!"' 2 °
The most memorable response came from Donley County. In response
to the caller's question, the clerk asked, "Is this for real? . .. Well, suppos-
edly you can file a petition to the court and go through the process. We
haven't ever done it since it's been in law, but if you wish to do that
then. .. "21 The clear implication was that they would not do it in their
122county, even though technically they had the legal responsibility to do
SO.
1 2 3
For a girl unaware of the open venue law, or unable to take advantage
of it because of limited resources, lack of access to transportation or an
inability to travel without attracting notice from parents, access to judicial
bypass proceedings would effectively be cut off.
112. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 2.
113. Id. at § 4 (indicating an unawareness of the capability of the court to have judicial
bypass proceedings to determine the need for parental involvement).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. District Clerk Office, supra note 53, at § 4.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(a)-(n) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005-2006).
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g. Refusal
Four counties simply refused to provide any information. 124 An em-
ployee in Bowie County replied, "That is not anything that we can advise
you on, legally or anything at all. We just can't advise you on that.' ' 25
Guadalupe County's response was, "It's up to the judge, is all I can
say.' 126 Cameron County said that the caller must come into their office
for information.'2 7 The woman from Smith County said, "I could not tell
you that.' 28 The clerk's office in Tom Green County told the caller "that
[it was] a legal matter that [could] be brought in district or county court"
and indicated that the conversation was over at that point.129 None of
these offices demonstrated assistance to further access to the judicial by-
pass proceedings.
h. Referrals to Other Counties
Three percent of responses recommended that the caller contact an of-
fice in another county. 3 ° Coleman County said that they were a small
county and that the caller would probably want to go to a larger
county.1 3 ' Crosby County said that they are a small county where every-
one knows each other, and that Lubbock would be a better option.132
Glasscock County indicated that they had never handled such a case, rec-
ommending the caller speak to Midland or Howard County and that she
herself would need to call them for information.'33 Goliad County men-
tioned open venue and strongly suggested going to Victoria County -
where an attorney might be appointed for the unborn child, indicating
further that their county was not a good choice.134 Hartley County rec-
ommended going to a larger county. 135 Loving County responded,
"Lady, I don't have the foggiest idea," and told the caller to call Austin
County.1 36 McMullen County said that they could not hold the proceed-
ings because they have no private area but recommended the caller con-
124. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 2.
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 4.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
130. Id. at § 2.
131. Id. at § 4.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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tact Live Oak County.1 37 Refugio County seemed to have a policy of
referring girls to Victoria County,13 but the clerk in Victoria did not to
know how to answer the question either.'39
These responses were separated from those simply saying that their
county did not handle them, because these responses did not deny their
county could do them, just recommended that other counties would be
better equipped to handle bypass proceedings. Implicit in each of the
other-county responses was a suggestion of open venue. As a result, such
responses have a better chance of leading to access to bypass
proceedings.
3. Our Survey Results Compared to Other Survey Results
The survey results obtained in 2006 are largely consistent with those of
an April 2005 study conducted by Jane's Due Process. The April 2005
survey polled sixty-eight counties, both district and county clerks.14° In
that survey, fifty-eight percent of the answers received were "I don't
know." '1 41 Only twenty percent acknowledged responsibility and could
provide information as to whether the judge would provide the minor an
attorney and how long the proceedings last. 142 Approximately nine per-
cent refused to provide any information.
1 43
The higher number of "acknowledged responsibility" answers in the
most recent survey of the district clerks office resulted from a more re-
laxed standard.1 44 The 2006 survey assumed that, even if the clerk pro-
vided inaccurate information over the phone, the office acknowledged its
responsibility even without knowledge of the relevant laws. This survey
more accurately reflects what occurs across Texas because more counties
were contacted, and callers were more persistent in contacting a person in
each office. Another possible factor accounting for any minor differences
in the results is the 2005 survey polled both district and county clerk of-
fices, while the 2006 survey focused entirely on the district clerks' offices.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4.
140. Telephone Interview by Jane's Due Process of Several County and Dist. Clerk
Offices, in Tex. (Spring 2005) [hereinafter Jane's Interviews] (on file with The Scholar: St.
Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at § 1.
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Overall, the pictures painted by these surveys are consistent with Me-
lissa Jacobs's 2003 study.1 45 A comparison of these studies suggests that
access through county officials has not improved over time, despite in-
creased media attention, the passage of the consent requirement, or the
introduction of Texas House Bill 1212.
C. Open Venue Is Necessary to Mitigate the Constitutional and
Practical Problems Presented by Ill-Prepared County Officials
Empirical data indicates that practical access to a judicial bypass pro-
ceeding is limited even without restrictive venue laws. 14 6 The open venue
law is critical for those girls who live in counties whose officials are not
fulfilling their statutory duties. The surveys of Texas counties make clear
the fact that counties are not prepared to handle a minor's questions re-
garding judicial bypass. 147 In order for judicial bypasses to be a reality in
the majority of Texas counties, prospective applicants must have the op-
tion to move freely among Texas's counties to seek assistance.
Removing open venue would arguably render the law unconstitutional
in practice. The state is not required to remove obstacles to obtaining an
abortion not of its own creation, 148 but the behavior of district and county
clerks is state action. The failure to adequately train employees in district
and county clerks' offices to handle judicial bypasses probably does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. But restricting minors to
offices that repeatedly offer no real access to bypass proceedings prevents
access to bypasses altogether-a result which violates both the spirit and
the letter of Bellotti.149 This is especially dangerous because not only will
girls be unable to access their right to seek a bypass, they will not even
know it exists. Girls who have no idea they have such a right will have no
way of seeking reform through normal political channels or litigation.
145. See generally Jacobs, supra note 61; District Clerk Offices, supra note 53, at § 4;
Jane's Interviews, supra note 140.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (finding that a pregnant woman has the
right to be in the same position she would have been in had the government not involved
itself in the abortion decision, but also reasoning that the government need not remove
obstacles not of its own creation).
149. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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V. OPEN VENUE IS CRITICAL EVEN WITH ACCESS AVAILABLE
THROUGH LOCAL OFFICIALS
Aside from maintaining actual access to bypasses, Texas's open venue
law provides as near a "confidentiality guarantee," 150 as a state can offer.
Even minors living in counties adequately staffed with knowledgeable of-
ficials may not be able to visit their local courthouse because a neighbor
or relative works there. In order to preserve maximum confidentiality,
girls should have maximum mobility to choose where to exercise their
right to seek a bypass hearing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proponents of legislation such as Texas House Bill No. 1212 have made
it very clear that their goal is to fight abortion. The elimination of open
venue is certainly one way of cutting down on the number of abortions
performed, but it would do so at the cost of the constitutional rights of
Texas's minors, and it would arbitrarily allocate this burden on those mi-
nors who have the misfortune of living in counties where officials are
unprepared or unwilling to follow the law. Although Texas has a long
way to go before local practice lives up to the standards set by the Texas
Parental Notification Rules, the Parental Rules provide a workable way
to protect the rights of both minors and parents. Removing open venue
would render the Parental Rules unconstitutional in practice and ques-
tionably unconstitutional on the page.
150. Id. at 644-46 (quoting the third prong of the test determining the confidentiality
of a regulation providing a minor access to a judicial bypass of parental consent).
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